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Expensive Speech: Citizens United v. FEC and the 
Free Speech Rights of Tax-Exempt Religious 
Organizations 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC1 
entered the national consciousness amid more than its fair share of 
controversy. During his 2010 State of the Union Address, with many 
of the robe-clad justices of the Supreme Court sitting front and 
center in the House Chambers, President Obama castigated the 
Court for “revers[ing] a century of law that [he] believe[d] [would] 
open the floodgates for special interests—including foreign 
corporations—to spend without limit in our elections.”2  
The President’s criticism, warranted or not, prompted immediate 
standing applause from many members of the House and Senate and 
a very surprising reaction from one member of the Supreme Court. 
Although the Justices have historically remained silent and 
unresponsive during the State of the Union Address, Justice Alito 
could not restrain himself from reacting to what he viewed as the 
President’s misstatement of the key holding and potential 
ramifications of Citizens United. Shaking his head and mouthing 
what appeared to be the words “not true,” Justice Alito made his 
disagreement with the President clear to a world audience. This 
controversial exchange, which provided enough fodder to fill several 
days of twenty-four hour news channel programming, demonstrated 
how impassioned individuals can become when money and political 
speech are at issue. It also made clear that even after over 200 years 
of constitutional interpretation, significant First Amendment 
questions remain in flux. 
The central holding in Citizens United is that, under the First 
Amendment, “the Government cannot restrict political speech based 
on the speaker’s corporate identity.”3 With that question answered, 
at least for the time being, it is now left to the legal world to 
                                                                                                           
 1. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
 2. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address. 
 3. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 902.  
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consider what the broader impact of this decision will be moving 
forward. Many serious questions remain as to how this holding will 
affect free speech rights and political campaigns. For instance, it 
remains unclear how this decision will affect the involvement of 
foreign corporations in American politics or the exact nature of 
Political Action Committees (“PACs”) under the new framework. 
Additionally, there is significant uncertainty regarding the impact 
Citizens United will have on tax-exempt religious organizations that 
are restricted from engaging in political activities under § 501(c)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue Code.4 Although each of these questions is 
worth serious review in light of Citizens United, this Note will focus 
specifically on the last question—how the decision in Citizens United 
affects tax-exempt religious organizations under § 501(c)(3).  
Under § 501(c)(3) certain organizations, including those 
“organized and operated exclusively for religious [or] charitable . . . 
purposes,” are exempt from paying federal taxes as long as they 
adhere to certain restrictions.5 These restrictions include limits on 
lobbying activities and participation in political campaigns.6 Over the 
years there have been a number of legal challenges to this political 
activities restriction, yet all have failed to overturn the prohibition.7 
It is likely, however, that in light of the holding in Citizens United, 
new challenges to this restriction will arise.8 As such, it is helpful to 
anticipate the issues that may arise with these potential challenges, 
including whether or not Citizens United even applies to tax-exempt 
religious organizations and, if so, how that holding affects their 
rights under § 501(c)(3). With a new emphasis on First Amendment 
political speech rights under the Citizens United decision, it is likely 
                                                                                                           
 4.  See Eliza Newlin Carney, Brave New World of Political Spending for Nonprofits, 
NATIONALJOURNAL.COM (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/no_ 
20100312_4650.php#. 
 5. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). For an overview of the history of and policy justifications 
for religious tax exemptions, see Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 971 (1999). 
 6. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 7.  See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Branch 
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. 
United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).  
 8. See MILTON CERNY, DOUGLAS W. CHARNAS & MICHELE A. W. MCKINNON, 
MCGUIREWOODS LLP, CITIZENS UNITED CHANGED LANDSCAPE: MAY PRODUCE SOME 
LANDMINES FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, Feb. 10, 2010, 
http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/news/ 
4532.asp?SearchFor=unconstitutional. 
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that any challenge to the § 501(c)(3) restrictions would be based on 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which limits the types of 
conditions government can place on the benefits it provides.9 
Although this doctrine has been used to make similar arguments in 
the past,10 the new First Amendment paradigm established by the 
Citizens United holding has changed the legal landscape on this 
issue. This Note contends that, based on this new free speech 
paradigm, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been given 
renewed strength in the argument against conditioning the benefit 
of tax exemption for religious organizations on the willingness of 
those organizations to give up their First Amendment speech rights. 
This Note also argues, however, that in light of other interests, 
including adherence to the Establishment Clause and the long-
recognized tradition of separation of church and state, some limits 
on the political activities of tax-exempt religious organizations 
should remain intact, preventing such organizations from 
maintaining tax-exempt status if they engage in completely 
unfettered political speech or lobbying.  
Part II of this Note reviews the background and central holding 
of Citizens United as well as the general provisions of § 501(c)(3) 
and the related restrictions, focusing specifically on the political 
activities test. Part III provides an overview of the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions, including a summary of the Supreme 
Court unconstitutional conditions cases most relevant to this issue. 
Part IV uses the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to analyze 
the legality of § 501(c)(3)’s political activities restriction for religious 
organizations in light of the decision in Citizens United. Part IV also 
considers the arguments against allowing tax-exempt religious 
organizations to engage in completely unfettered political activities 
and discusses possible limits that should continue to govern such 
organizations. Part V concludes this Note. 
                                                                                                           
 9. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 
1415 (1989). 
 10. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
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II.  CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC: A NEW PIECE IN THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT PUZZLE 
A.  Background and History 
In 2007, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation with the 
stated purpose of “restoring our government to citizens’ control,”11 
released a film entitled Hillary: The Movie in an attempt to inform 
and influence voters during the 2008 presidential election.12 The 
film, a politically charged documentary that was highly critical of 
Hillary Clinton and her husband, was initially made available in 
theaters and through DVD sales.13 However, in an effort to make the 
film accessible to an even broader audience, Citizens United also 
wanted to distribute the film through video-on-demand, which 
allows those who subscribe to digital cable systems to select the 
video at any time from an on-screen menu.14 Accordingly, Citizens 
United sought an agreement with a cable company, which offered to 
make the film available to its subscribers.15 Additionally, Citizens 
United filmed three television commercials promoting the film and 
planned to pay for the costs associated with airing those ads.16 
Under federal law, corporations and unions are prohibited from 
“using general treasury funds to make direct contributions to 
candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in 
connection with certain qualified federal elections.”17 The Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 extended this prohibition to 
“electioneering communication,”18 which includes “any broadcast, 
cable, or satellite communication which refers to a clearly identified 
candidate for Federal office; . . . made within 60 days before a 
general, special, or runoff election . . . or 30 days before a primary or 
preference election.”19 Based on this statutory language, Citizens 
United feared it would face civil and criminal repercussions if it 
                                                                                                           
 11. About Citizens United, CITIZENS UNITED, http://www.citizensunited.org/ 
about.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). 
 12. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).  
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006). 
 18. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2). 
 19. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i).  
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offered the film, as planned, through video-on-demand within thirty 
days of the primary election.20 As such, before moving forward with 
the plan, Citizens United sought a declaratory judgment on the 
matter, as well as an injunction against any potential FEC action.21 
The district court denied this motion and granted the FEC’s motion 
for summary judgment.22 The Supreme Court docketed the case in 
August 200823 and finally heard oral arguments in March 2009.24 
Despite the fact that the 2008 presidential election had long since 
passed by the time oral arguments were heard, the Court took up the 
case because, in its view, there were much broader issues at hand 
than simply whether or not Citizens United would be in violation of 
§ 441b.25 The more pressing issues, as the Court viewed them—and 
certainly those with the most potential for a lasting impact on First 
Amendment jurisprudence—are those dealing with whether or not 
§ 441b and other restrictions of the free speech of corporations are 
even constitutional.26  
B. The Court’s Reasoning 
1. The applicability of 2 U.S.C. § 441b 
The Court in Citizens United, in an opinion written by Justice 
Kennedy, began its analysis of the key issues by looking at whether 
or not § 441b was applicable to the activities of Citizens United.27 
Citizens United had argued that the film did not fit within the 
definition of “electioneering communication” because it “was not 
‘publicly distributed.’”28 This argument was based on the fact that 
the video-on-demand nature of distribution limited the viewership to 
only those who requested the film, meaning, at least under Citizens 
United’s interpretation, that the transmission would be seen by one 
person or one household—not the 50,000 or more viewers required 
                                                                                                           
 20. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.  
 21. Id. 
 22. See Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 23. Id., appeal docketed, No. 08-205 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2008).  
 24. Robert Barnes, ‘Hillary: The Movie’ to Get Supreme Court Screening, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 15, 2009, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2009/03/14/AR2009031401603_pf.html. 
 25. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 888–89. 
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under the statute.29 Citizens United also argued that because Hillary 
is simply a “‘documentary film that examines certain historical 
events’”—not express advocacy or its “functional equivalent”—it did 
not fall under the provisions of § 441b.30 The Court rejected both 
arguments.31  
First, the Court determined that the video-on-demand feature 
did not limit the “public” nature of the film’s distribution as Citizens 
United had argued.32 Although it is true that under the video-on-
demand format the film is requested on an individual basis and is not 
broadcast automatically to a large number of people, the Court 
found that the determination of whether or not a cable transmission 
is “publicly distributed” is whether or not it “‘can be received by 
50,000 or more persons.’”33 In this case, the Court found that the 
distribution of Hillary clearly met that criterion.34 On the question 
of whether or not Hillary constituted express advocacy, another 
requirement under the statute, the Court determined that “there is 
no reasonable interpretation of Hillary other than as an appeal to 
vote against Senator Clinton.”35 Under this conclusion, the Court 
held that the film qualified as the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy, making § 441b applicable to Citizens United’s actions.36 
Having made this determination, the Court turned to the more 
difficult and certainly more controversial analysis of the 
constitutionality of § 441b and the claim that the statute violates the 
free speech rights of Citizens United.37 
2. First Amendment concerns of § 441b 
The Court could not resolve the question regarding the 
constitutionality of § 441b with the same ease with which it disposed 
of the question of § 441b’s applicability. In deciding this issue, the 
majority’s analysis included a rather lengthy and detailed review of 
First Amendment history and jurisprudence.38 Appropriately, 
                                                                                                           
 29. Id. at 889. 
 30. Id. at 889–90.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 889. 
 33. Id. at 887 (emphasis added). 
 34. Id. at 889. 
 35. Id. at 890.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 892. 
 38. Id. at 896–99. 
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however, this analysis began with the simplicity of the constitutional 
language itself: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”39 This language, with its outright proscription 
on the abridgment of free speech, provides the framework with 
which to view the entirety of the majority’s reasoning. “Speech,” 
argued Justice Kennedy, “is an essential mechanism of democracy, 
for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people.”40 
Because such speech is so critical to the proper functioning of our 
democracy, reasoned the majority, the government is restricted from 
“allowing speech by some but not others.”41 This means, at least 
according to Justice Kennedy and the majority, that “political speech 
does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source 
is a corporation.’”42 Therefore, the restrictions placed on such speech 
by § 441b are unconstitutional. As simple as this reasoning may 
sound, in order to reach this controversial decision, the majority had 
to address, and ultimately overturn, years of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.  
Over the last fifty years, several major cases have addressed the 
issue of corporate First Amendment rights, and some of them have 
reached conclusions in direct opposition to the majority’s holding in 
Citizens United. Chief among these cases is Austin v. Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce, which held that political speech can, in fact, 
be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity.43 As Kennedy 
noted, quoting directly from his own dissent in Austin, the Austin 
Court “‘upheld a direct restriction on the independent expenditure 
of funds for political speech for the first time in [this Court’s] 
history.’”44 To justify this precedent, the Austin Court had to create 
or “identify” a new government interest—the antidistortion 
interest.45  
According to the Austin majority, the antidistortion interest 
consists of preventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help 
                                                                                                           
 39. Id. at 896; U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 40. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 900 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 
(1978)).  
 43. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. 
 44. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting)). 
 45. Id.; see also Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.  
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of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”46 In other 
words, the Austin Court was concerned about the “unfair 
advantage” that corporations would have “in the political 
marketplace” due to their corporate wealth, and the Austin Court 
believed this concern justified an attempt to “equalize” the relative 
influence of competing voices in American politics.47 The Citizens 
United majority did not buy this argument. Citing a number of 
significant pre-Austin Court decisions for support, the Citizens 
United Court reasoned: “The First Amendment’s protections do not 
depend on the speaker’s ‘financial ability to engage in public 
discussion.’”48 Rather, “political speech” is “political speech” and is 
“‘indispensable . . . [whether it] comes from a corporation [or] an 
individual.’”49 According to Kennedy, rather than “interfere[] with 
the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas”50 by controlling who can and 
cannot speak, the Court and Congress should let the First 
Amendment govern and “[f]actions should be checked by permitting 
them all to speak and by entrusting the people to judge what is true 
and what is false.”51 Under this reasoning, Citizens United overruled 
Austin, “‘effectively invalidat[ing] not only BCRA Section 203, but 
also 2 U.S.C. 441b’s prohibition . . . for express advocacy.’”52 This 
decision, according to the majority, simply restored the pre-Austin 
line of precedent from First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and 
Buckley v. Valeo, returning to an interpretation of the First 
Amendment that does not allow the government to “suppress 
political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”53 It 
is this holding that drew the ire of President Obama and raises the 
potential for a number of new questions and legal challenges, 
including those related to the First Amendment rights of religious 
organizations exempt from taxes under § 501(c)(3).  
                                                                                                           
 46. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.  
 47. Id. at 659–60 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 
(1986)). 
 48. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 
(1976)).  
 49.  Id. (quoting First Nat’l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)). 
 50. Id. at 906 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 
(2008)). 
 51. Id. at 907 (citation omitted). 
 52. Id. at 913. 
 53. Id. 
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C.  IRS § 501(c)(3): Tax-Exempt Religious Organizations 
Before analyzing how the holding from Citizens United will 
affect tax-exempt religious organizations, it is first necessary to 
review the basic definition of a tax-exempt religious organization and 
the statutory restrictions to which such an organization must adhere. 
This definition and the associated restrictions are found in 
§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and the corresponding 
IRS regulations. Under § 501(c)(3), an organization is exempt from 
Federal income taxes if it is  
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or 
educational purposes, . . . [so long as] no part of the net earnings 
of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying 
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence 
legislation . . . , and which does not participate in, or intervene 
in . . . , any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) 
any candidate for public office.54  
In essence, an organization may receive and maintain tax-exempt 
status if it meets each of four tests: (1) the organizational test;55 (2) 
the operational test;56 (3) the private inurement test;57 and (4) the 
political activities test.58 Although failing any one of these tests will 
place an organization in jeopardy of losing its tax-exempt status, this 
Note will focus primarily on the political activities test because that is 
the test most likely to be affected by the holding in Citizens United. 
Accordingly, it is worthwhile to consider the restrictions of this test 
in more depth. 
                                                                                                           
 54. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
 55. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (2010) (“An organization is organized exclusively 
for one or more exempt purposes only if its articles of organization . . . (a) Limit the purposes 
. . . to one or more exempt purposes; and (b) Do not expressly empower the organization to 
engage, otherwise than as an insubstantial part of its activities, in activities which in themselves 
are not in furtherance of one or more exempt purposes.”). 
 56. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (“An organization will be regarded as operated exclusively 
for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one 
or more of such exempt purposes specified in § 501(c)(3). An organization will not be so 
regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt 
purpose.”). 
 57. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (“An organization is not operated exclusively for one 
or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private 
shareholders or individuals.”).  
 58. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3).  
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According to the IRS regulations governing the political 
activities test, 
An organization is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt 
purposes if . . . a substantial part of its activities is attempting to 
influence legislation . . . [or] it participates or intervenes, directly or 
indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to 
any candidate for public office.59 
Under these regulations tax-exempt religious organizations, and 
any other § 501(c)(3) organization for that matter, are severely 
limited in the types of political activities in which they can engage.60 
That is not to say, however, that such organizations are banned 
completely from any type of political activity. Even though the 
statutory language requires that a tax-exempt organization be 
operated “exclusively” for one of the exempt purposes, this absolute 
language is tempered by the fact that the IRS regulations allow an 
organization to engage in certain non-exempt activities so long as 
such activities do not constitute a “primary” part of that 
organization’s activities.61 Thus, tax-exempt religious organizations 
do have some latitude to engage in lobbying activities, but in doing 
so they run the risk of crossing the somewhat undefined boundary 
into non-exempt status.62  
With such extreme limits on the ability of tax-exempt religious 
organizations to engage in political activities without losing their 
exemptions, it should come as no surprise that a number of such 
organizations have challenged this element of § 501(c)(3) as 
unconstitutionally restrictive.63 One of the most famous of these 
challenges came in the 1972 case Christian Echoes National Ministry, 
Inc. v. United States, in which Christian Echoes National Ministry, a 
nonprofit religious corporation, sued the United States government 
for a refund of Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) taxes 
under the claim that the organization was exempt under 
§ 501(c)(3).64  
                                                                                                           
 59. Id.  §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(i) to (iii). 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id.  § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e). 
 62. For further discussion of the restrictions on political activity of § 501(c)(3) 
organizations, see Meghan J. Ryan, Can the IRS Silence Religious Organizations?, 40 IND. L. 
REV. 73 (2007).  
 63. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 64. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 851 (10th 
Cir. 1972).  
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Christian Echoes filed suit after the IRS revoked its tax-exempt 
status on the grounds that the organization “had engaged in 
substantial activity aimed at influencing legislation; and . . . had 
directly and indirectly intervened in political campaigns on behalf of 
candidates for public office.”65 Following an examination of 
Christian Echoes’s activities, the IRS found that it had published a 
number of pamphlets and articles attempting to influence directly 
public opinion on specific legislation, including bills related to civil 
rights, Medicare, and firearms control, among many others.66 
Christian Echoes had also intervened in federal elections in an 
attempt to elect conservative politicians like Strom Thurmond and 
Barry Goldwater and defeat liberal politicians like Lyndon Johnson 
and Hubert Humphrey.67 On these grounds, the IRS found that 
Christian Echoes had violated the political activities test of               
§ 501(c)(3) and could no longer be considered tax-exempt under 
the statute.68  
In its suit, Christian Echoes claimed that the political activities 
test violated both the free exercise and the free speech clauses of the 
First Amendment.69 The Tenth Circuit rejected both claims, 
reasoning that “First Amendment rights are not absolutes and that 
courts must balance [these] freedoms against the congressional 
enactment . . . .”70 The court also held that because “tax exemption 
is a privilege, a matter of grace rather than right, . . . the limitations 
contained in Section 501(c)(3) . . . do not deprive Christian Echoes 
of its constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech.”71 Under the 
court’s reasoning, the limits of § 501(c)(3) do not restrain a religious 
organization from exercising its First Amendment rights.72 An 
organization must simply make a choice between exercising its First 
Amendment free speech rights and receiving the “privilege” of tax 
exemption.73  
This reasoning begs the question of whether or not the 
government may permissibly condition a privilege such as tax 
                                                                                                           
 65. Id. at 853. 
 66. Id. at 855.  
 67. Id. at 856. 
 68. Id. at 852–53. 
 69. Id. at 856.  
 70. Id. at 857. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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exemption on the willingness of an organization (or individual, for 
that matter) to give up its constitutional rights. The Supreme Court 
has dealt with this question numerous times, leading to a long-
standing legal doctrine known as the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions. Because this issue is the focus of this Note, before 
moving forward with the analysis of Citizens United’s impact on the 
rights of § 501(c)(3) religious organizations, it is necessary to review 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and the relevant Supreme 
Court jurisprudence governing it.  
III. THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
At surface level, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions 
seems simple and straightforward. In reality, however, decades of 
unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence have demonstrated that 
applying the doctrine is much more complicated and inconsistent 
than one might imagine. In short, the doctrine stands for the 
principle “that government may not grant a benefit on the condition 
that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the 
government may withhold that benefit altogether.”74 Put differently, 
an unconstitutional condition may exist “when government offers a 
benefit on condition that the recipient perform or forego an activity 
that a preferred constitutional right normally protects from 
government interference.”75 This is not to say, of course, that the 
government may not attach certain restrictions or burdens to any 
benefit it provides. In fact, most benefits provided by the 
government have certain conditions attached. After all, one would be 
hard pressed to argue that something as ordinary as driving on a 
                                                                                                           
 74. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1415. 
 75. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1421–22. In a few limited cases, the Supreme Court has 
held that no unconstitutional condition exists where there is “rough proportionality” or an 
“essential nexus” between the benefit conferred and the constitutional right implicated. See 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987). This suggests that an unconstitutional condition exists only when “the government     
. . . require[s] a person to give up a constitutional right . . . in exchange for a discretionary 
benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to 
the property.” Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385. However, the Court has never extended this “essential 
nexus” requirement beyond “cases where the state requires land to be dedicated to public use 
in exchange for permits to develop other portions of the property.” Philip Morris, Inc. v. 
Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 46 n.20 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999)). Thus, because these proportionality concerns are 
implicated only in the realm of the Takings Clause, there is no need to discuss the “essential 
nexus” any further in this Note.   
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government owned road does not come with certain conditions such 
as obeying the speed limit or stopping at red lights. What 
distinguishes an unconstitutional condition from a permissible 
condition is that the unconstitutional condition implicates “those 
rights that depend on some sort of exercise of autonomous choice by 
the rightholder, such as individual rights to speech, exercise of 
religion or privacy.”76 Thus, unconstitutional conditions problems 
often arise in cases involving First Amendment rights.  
Several Supreme Court cases have addressed the doctrine in the 
context of First Amendment claims. In each case the Court 
emphasized that “‘the government “may not deny a benefit to a 
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . 
freedom of speech” even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.’”77 
This raises the question that is the focus of this Note: in light of the 
Court’s decision in Citizens United reaffirming the importance of 
First Amendment political speech rights, is it an unconstitutional 
condition to require religious organizations to give up their free 
speech rights in order to receive a tax exemption? Although this 
question has been asked before (with no perfectly clear answer), the 
Citizens United decision adds a new piece to the puzzle, requiring a 
fresh analysis of this issue. Key to this analysis is the Supreme Court’s 
relevant jurisprudence related to the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, tax exemptions, and the First Amendment free speech 
rights of religious organizations. 
A.  Key Cases Involving the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions 
Three of the key cases involving the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions are Speiser v. Randall, Sherbert v. Verner, and Perry v. 
Sinderman. These cases, respectively, are discussed in the following 
sections. 
1. Speiser v. Randall  
Although the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was first 
created during the Lochner era,78 the doctrine really began to take 
                                                                                                           
 76. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1426. 
 77. United States v. American Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003) (quoting 
Board of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty., Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (quoting 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972))).  
 78. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 1416.  
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shape more recently in Speiser v. Randall,79 a case decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1958. In Speiser, a taxpayer challenged a provision 
in the California Constitution providing that “no person or 
organization which advocates the overthrow of the Government of 
the United States or the State by force or violence” is eligible to 
“[r]eceive any exemption from any tax imposed by this State.”80 The 
taxpayer in this case, a World War II veteran, was denied a veterans’ 
property tax exemption on the grounds that he refused to make an 
oath that he would “not advocate the overthrow of the Government 
of the United States or the State of California,” as required by the 
application for tax exemption.81 In his complaint, the taxpayer 
claimed that conditioning a tax exemption on such an oath is 
“forbidden by the Federal Constitution”82 because it denies 
“freedom of speech without the procedural safeguards required by 
the Due Process Clause.”83 In addressing this claim, the Court 
reasoned that “[t]o deny an exemption to claimants who engage in 
certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such 
speech.”84 In effect it would be “the same as if the State were to fine 
them for this speech.”85 Most importantly, perhaps, the Court 
rejected the State of California’s contention that denial of a tax 
exemption does “not infringe speech” because this exemption “is a 
‘privilege,’” not a right.86 As will be demonstrated below, this 
“privilege” versus “right” issue continues to be a major element of 
unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence, which will most certainly 
have important implications on any future decision related to tax-
exempt religious organizations.  
                                                                                                           
 79. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).  
 80. Id. at 516 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 19). 
 81. Id. at 514–15.  
 82. Id. at 515. 
 83. Id. at 517.  
 84. Id. at 518.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. This reasoning should be compared to the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Christian 
Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, discussed above. In that case, as noted above, 
the court held that because a tax exemption is a privilege, not a right, “withholding exemption 
from nonprofit corporations [does] not deprive [them] of [their] constitutionally guaranteed 
right of free speech.” 470 F.2d 849, 857 (1972). 
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2. Sherbert v. Verner to Perry v. Sindermann 
Just five years after the Speiser decision, the Supreme Court once 
again faced an unconstitutional conditions question in Sherbert v. 
Verner.87 Unlike Speiser, however, the dispute in Sherbert dealt 
specifically with religious issues, adding an important element to the 
development of the unconstitutional conditions puzzle. In Sherbert, 
the appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, lost 
her job for refusing to work on Saturday, which she considered to be 
the Sabbath Day.88 Following her termination, appellant was unable 
to find another job due to the same religious restrictions.89 As such, 
when she attempted to secure unemployment benefits she was 
denied by the state government.90 South Carolina law provided that 
“to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be ‘able to work and . . . 
available for work” and that “if . . . [a claimant] has failed, without 
good cause . . . to accept available suitable work,’ she will not be 
eligible to receive unemployment benefits.91 Unsurprisingly, the 
appellant challenged this law and the government’s refusal to provide 
unemployment benefits as an infringement of her free exercise rights 
under the First Amendment.92  
The Court sided with the appellant on this issue, determining 
that the denial of benefits in this instance did, in fact, impose an 
unconstitutional burden on the individual rights of the appellant.93 
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, argued that “[i]t is too late in 
the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be 
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or 
privilege.”94 In the Court’s mind, it made no difference whether the 
benefit at issue was a “right” or a privilege.95 Relying heavily on 
Speiser, the Sherbert Court held “that conditions upon public 
benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their 
                                                                                                           
 87. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 88. Id. at 399. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 399–401. 
 91. Id. at 400–01(internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 92. Id. at 401. 
 93. Id. at 403.  
 94. Id. at 404.  
 95. Id. 
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purpose, as to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment 
freedoms.”96 This is true even when the benefit is “gratuitous.”97  
This reasoning was reiterated nearly a decade later in Perry v. 
Sindermann,98 in which the Court reviewed the case of a state-
employed teacher whose contract was not renewed because, as he 
claimed, he had been critical of the Board of Regents.99 The Board’s 
action, he alleged, infringed upon his First Amendment freedom of 
speech.100 Although this case was ultimately decided on grounds 
largely unrelated to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the 
Court reviewed the principles of the doctrine to ensure that the 
denied contract renewal had not been based on an unconstitutional 
condition.101 In language reminiscent of both Speiser and Sherbert, 
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, reasoned:  
[E]ven though a person has no “right” to a valuable governmental 
benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit 
for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the 
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on 
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—
especially, his interest in freedom of speech.102 
Once again, the Court emphasized the unique position of First 
Amendment rights, especially freedom of speech, by rejecting the 
notion that receipt of a governmental benefit could be based on 
some condition that interferes with a constitutional right. Although 
the Speiser, Sherbert, and Perry Courts emphatically argued against 
such conditions, the Court has, in more recent years, injected 
significant inconsistency into the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions, carving out a number of exceptions governing its 
application. This Note turns now to a review of the cases most 
relevant to these exceptions.  
                                                                                                           
 96. Id. at 405 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).  
 97. Id. 
 98. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).  
 99. Id. at 594–95. 
 100. Id. at 595.  
 101. Id. at 596–98. 
 102. Id. at 597.  
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B. Cases that Undermine the Doctrine of Unconstitutional 
Conditions 
1. Regan v. Taxation with Representation 
Unlike the cases discussed above, Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation,103 decided in 1983, was the first major Supreme 
Court case to consider the political activities restrictions of 
§ 501(c)(3) within the framework of the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine.104 Undoubtedly, any future challenge to the § 501(c)(3) 
political activities restriction under the new Citizens United 
framework will be forced to reconcile the Court’s holding in Regan. 
As such, it is important to understand the facts and reasoning of this 
case in order to understand the potential distinctions that may be 
drawn between Regan and future challenges to § 501(c)(3).  
 a. Facts and procedural history. In Regan, a nonprofit 
corporation, Taxation with Representation (“TWR”), filed suit after 
the IRS denied its application for tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) 
for what appeared to be substantial lobbying activities.105 TWR was 
initially organized as a nonprofit charitable and educational 
organization with the goal of “represent[ing] the general public on 
tax issues before Congress, the courts, and the executive branch.”106 
Not surprisingly, to accomplish this goal, TWR engaged in 
substantial lobbying activities, placing the organization in direct 
violation of the political activities test of § 501(c)(3).107 As a result of 
these lobbying activities, TWR became ineligible for the tax 
exemption typically allowed for charitable and educational nonprofit 
corporations under § 501(c)(3).108 The suit filed by TWR after the 
adverse determination by the IRS alleged that the § 501(c)(3) 
provision on which the denial of tax exemption was based was 
unconstitutional because it conditioned a governmental benefit on 
the willingness of an organization to give up its First Amendment 
free speech rights.109 This unconstitutional conditions claim was 
                                                                                                           
 103. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).  
 104. Id. at 542. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Taxation with Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 107. Id. at 718. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 725. TWR also claimed that the IRS’s denial of its application for tax 
exemption violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Regan, 461 U.S. at 542. 
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rejected by both the district court and the circuit court, leading to an 
appeal heard by the Supreme Court.110 Once again, TWR’s 
unconstitutional conditions argument was rejected, and the political 
activities test of § 501(c)(3) was upheld as it relates to nonprofit 
organizations.111  
 b. The Court’s holding and analysis. In analyzing TWR’s 
unconstitutional conditions claim, the Regan Court looked first to 
precedents it had established in Speiser and its progeny.112 The Court 
conceded that in the past it had “held that the government may not 
deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional 
right.”113 However, the Court refused to apply the Speiser model to 
this case.114 Instead, the Regan Court based its analysis on the rule 
established in Cammarano v. United States,115 a case decided less 
than one year after the Speiser decision.  
The dispute in Cammarano centered on the question of whether 
an IRS regulation disallowing taxpayers from deducting money used 
to defeat legislation as a business expense was permissible under the 
Constitution.116 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Harlan, 
held that the First Amendment does not require the government to 
subsidize lobbying activities.117 The Court based this holding on the 
reasoning that such a tax deduction was not denied because the 
taxpayers were “engag[ing] in constitutionally protected activities”; 
rather, the regulation simply required taxpayers “to pay for those 
activities entirely out of their own pockets, as everyone else engaging 
in similar activities is required to do under the provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code.”118 The Regan Court relied heavily on this 
reasoning, ultimately concluding that, consistent with Cammarano, 
§ 501(c)(3)’s restriction on political activities is constitutional 
because it does not prohibit First Amendment speech.119 Instead, 
                                                                                                           
However, this claim and the Court’s related reasoning will not be discussed here, as it is not 
critical to the focus of this Note. 
 110. Regan, 461 U.S. at 542. 
 111. Id. at 545–48. 
 112. Id. at 545. 
 113. Id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).  
 114. Id.  
 115. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).  
 116. Id. at 499–500. 
 117. Id. at 513; see also Regan, 461 U.S. at 546. 
 118. Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513. 
 119. Regan, 461 U.S. at 550.  
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§ 501(c)(3) simply upholds the principle that Congress will not 
subsidize political activities through tax exemptions, which, 
according to the Court, have “much the same effect as a cash grant 
to the organization.”120 In other words, “although government may 
not place obstacles in the path of a [person’s] exercise of . . . 
freedom of [speech], it need not remove those not of its own 
creation.”121  
In the case of TWR, the Court concluded that tax exemptions 
are “a matter of [congressional] grace”122 and that even if the 
organization “does not have as much money as it wants, and thus 
cannot exercise its freedom of speech as much as it would like, the 
Constitution ‘does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may 
be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.’”123 The 
Court also found that TWR could continue to lobby while still 
maintaining tax exemption on its non-lobbying activities by creating 
a “dual structure” in which it maintained “a § 501(c)(3) 
organization for its nonlobbying activities and a § 501(c)(4) 
organization for lobbying.”124 Although § 501(c)(4) organizations 
are also tax-exempt, they differ from § 501(c)(3) organizations in 
that contributions made to a § 501(c)(4) organization are not 
deductible.125 Additionally, a § 501(c)(4) organization “may engage 
in an unlimited amount of lobbying, provided that the lobbying is 
related to the organization’s exempt purpose” and may also “engage 
in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to candidates for 
public office provided that such intervention does not constitute the 
organization’s primary activity.”126 The availability of this option, 
reasoned the Court, also undermined TWR’s unconstitutional 
conditions claim on the grounds that a reasonable alternative to 
giving up First Amendment free speech rights existed.127  
                                                                                                           
 120. Id. at 544–46.  
 121. Id. at 549–50 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980)). 
 122. Id. at 549 (quoting Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958)).  
 123. Id. at 550 (quoting Harris, 448 U.S. at 318)).  
 124. Id. at 544. 
 125. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(B) (2010). 
 126. John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and Lobbying 
Activities of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, IRS, EXEMPT ORGS.-
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM, FY 2003, at L-2, available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-tege/eotopicl03.pdf.  
 127. Regan, 461 U.S. at 543–46 (1983). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/8/2011 4:34 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2010 
2262 
In his concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall, Justice Blackmun offered some noteworthy reasoning 
of his own regarding TWR’s unconstitutional conditions claim. 
Although he agreed with the majority’s final holding on the First 
Amendment claim, Justice Blackmun felt the need to distance 
himself from certain elements of the reasoning on which that 
holding was based. In Justice Blackmun’s opinion: 
If viewed in isolation, the lobbying restriction contained in 
§ 501(c)(3) violates the principle . . . “that the government may 
not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional 
right.” Section 501(c)(3) does not merely deny a subsidy for 
lobbying activities, it deprives an otherwise eligible organization of 
its tax-exempt status and its eligibility to receive tax-deductible 
contributions for all its activities, whenever one of those activities is 
“substantial lobbying.” Because lobbying is protected by the First 
Amendment . . . , § 501(c)(3) therefore denies a significant benefit 
to organizations choosing to exercise their constitutional rights.128 
By this reasoning, the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3) is saved 
only by the existence of the less restrictive § 501(c)(4) option.129 In 
fact, as Justice Blackmun argued, if that option were eliminated or 
subjected to further restrictions, “the First Amendment problems 
would be insurmountable. . . . [A]ny such restriction would render 
the statutory scheme unconstitutional.”130  
It is the majority’s opinion that is controlling, of course—not 
Justice Blackmun’s. Thus, the rule to be taken from Regan is that 
§ 501(c)(3)’s political activities restriction, as applied to a nonprofit 
tax-exempt organization, does not violate the First Amendment 
because it does not prevent an organization from engaging in 
political speech. The restriction simply supports the notion that 
government will not subsidize that speech. Although this is the 
majority holding, Justice Blackmun’s concurrence raises a number of 
compelling issues that will be explored in Part IV, especially his 
argument regarding the scenario without the less restrictive option 
under § 501(c)(4).  
It is important to note, however, that the Regan Court 
considered the restrictions of § 501(c)(3) only as they applied to a 
                                                                                                           
 128. Id. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 553–54.  
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non-profit corporation, not a religious organization.131 As discussed 
below,132 this is an important distinction, one that is critical to the 
focus of this Note. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has never 
specifically addressed the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3)’s political 
speech restrictions as applied to religious organizations. However, 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Branch 
Ministries v. Rossotti.133 
In Branch Ministries, a church challenged the revocation of its 
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status after it engaged in campaigning 
against a presidential candidate.134 Just four days prior to the 
presidential election in 1992, Branch Ministries took out two full-
page newspaper advertisements in an attempt to persuade “Christians 
not to vote for then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton because of his 
positions on certain moral issues.”135 As a result of this political 
activity, the IRS revoked Branch Ministries’ tax-exempt status.136 In 
its complaint, the church claimed that this revocation, and the          
§ 501(c)(3) restrictions on which it was based, violated the First 
Amendment by restricting speech.137 The circuit court rejected this 
argument, relying heavily on Regan in its decision. Like the 
reasoning of the Regan majority, the Branch Ministries court held 
that despite the strict limitations on political speech under 
§ 501(c)(3), the church had less restrictive options, including the 
creation of a § 501(c)(4) entity, by which it could engage in political 
activities.138 The Branch Ministries court went on to explain that 
once a § 501(c)(4) entity had been created, that entity could also 
create a Political Action Committee (“PAC”) “that would be free to 
participate in political campaigns” without limitations on the amount 
of funding it could provide, just as long as that funding did not 
come from the church’s tax-free dollars.139 The availability of these 
options, along with the court’s conclusion that the government need 
not subsidize the free speech rights of a church, led the circuit court 
                                                                                                           
 131. See Regan, 461 U.S. 540.  
 132. See infra Part IV. 
 133. 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
 134. Id. at 139. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 140–41. 
 138. Id at 143. 
 139. Id.  
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to uphold the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3)’s political speech 
restrictions, even as they apply to a religious organization.  
This exact position involving religious organizations has never 
been adopted or even addressed by the Supreme Court. Thus, the 
circuit court’s decision regarding the constitutionality of 
§ 501(c)(3)’s political speech restrictions, at least as it applies to 
religious organizations, is not controlling outside of the D.C. 
Circuit. This holding may, in fact, inform the Supreme Court’s 
decision on any future challenges to § 501(c)(3), particularly in its 
reliance on Regan. However, because there may be a slight gap in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, there is potential for a successful 
challenge to such a restriction on political speech, particularly in light 
of Citizens United. This Note now discusses that possibility. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Under the newly established framework of Citizens United, a 
corporation is now considered a person for the purposes of First 
Amendment free speech rights. Although this decision did not deal 
specifically with § 501(c)(3) organizations, the general First 
Amendment principle of the Citizens United holding is likely to have 
significant implications on the political speech rights of all tax-
exempt § 501(c)(3) organizations, especially religious organizations. 
As it currently stands, Citizens United made no changes to the 
restrictions of the § 501(c)(3) political activities test, meaning that 
even though a § 501(c)(3) organization may be considered a person 
with respect to First Amendment rights, exercising those rights in 
the political context will still jeopardize the tax-exempt status of that 
organization. That being said, the Citizens United decision has 
opened the door for tax-exempt organizations to challenge the 
constitutionality of these political activity restrictions of § 501(c)(3) 
on the grounds that such restrictions unconstitutionally condition a 
benefit (i.e., a tax exemption) on an organization’s willingness to 
give up its First Amendment free speech rights.  
Given the history of § 501(c)(3) case law discussed above,140 
such legal challenges will face an uphill battle. However, in light of 
the holding and language of the Citizens United decision, many of 
the previous decisions in this area of the law can be distinguished, 
bringing new life to the possibility of eliminating the political 
                                                                                                           
 140. See supra Part III. 
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activities restriction of § 501(c)(3). This Note turns now to a 
discussion of the challenges to § 501(c)(3)’s political speech 
restrictions that tax-exempt religious organizations may raise in light 
of the Citizens United holding. In doing so, this Note contends that, 
based on the general principle espoused in Citizens United, the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions provides a powerful 
argument against conditioning the benefit of tax exemptions for 
religious organizations on the willingness of those organizations to 
give up their First Amendment speech rights. This Note will also 
argue, however, that in light of other interests, including adherence 
to the Establishment Clause and the long recognized tradition of 
separation of church and state, some limits on the political activities 
of tax-exempt religious organizations should remain intact, 
preventing such organizations from maintaining tax-exempt status if 
they engage in completely unfettered political speech or lobbying.  
A. The Distinct Nature of Religious Organizations 
At the outset of this analysis it is necessary to place some limits 
on the scope of this discussion. While it is true that § 501(c)(3) 
provides a tax exemption to many types of organizations—including 
nonprofit educational and charitable organizations—this discussion 
will focus specifically on religious organizations exempted under 
§ 501(c)(3). In doing so, this Note first argues that even though     
§ 501(c)(3)’s requirements and restrictions, including the political 
activities test, apply to all § 501(c)(3) organizations, in the context 
of tax law there are inherent and substantial differences between 
religious organizations and all other tax-exempt organizations. This 
distinction between tax-exempt religious organizations and all other 
tax-exempt organizations is critical to the later analysis that 
distinguishes previous Court holdings from any future legal 
challenges in light of Citizens.  
The Supreme Court considered the unique nature of religious 
organizations in the context of tax law when it decided Walz v. Tax 
Commission of New York in 1970.141 Walz addressed the question of 
whether or not the government could grant a property tax 
exemption to religious organizations without violating the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.142 In addressing this 
                                                                                                           
 141. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).  
 142. Id. at 667. 
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issue, the Court also considered its obligation to uphold the “other” 
religion clause of the First Amendment—the Free Exercise Clause. 
In the words of Chief Justice Burger, “The Court has struggled to 
find a neutral course between [these] two Religion clauses, both of 
which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to 
a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.”143 With this 
challenge in mind, the Court felt obligated to use the “play in the 
joints” between these two clauses to produce the most neutral 
result.144 In the case of Walz, the Court found that the tax 
exemption for religious organizations was, in fact, the most neutral 
position between the two Religion Clauses and was, therefore, 
constitutional. “The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship [or 
a subsidy145] since the government does not transfer part of its 
revenue to churches . . . .”146 Additionally, “[t]he exemption creates 
only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state 
and far less than taxation of churches.”147 Under this reasoning, not 
only is a tax exemption for religious organizations permissible, it is 
the most appropriate way to maintain the neutrality demanded by 
the Constitution in matters related to religious organizations. Thus, 
this type of reasoning, standing alone, supports the notion that 
religious organizations should be dealt with differently than 
organizations that do not bring the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment into play. However, the Court in subsequent years has 
backtracked somewhat from this stance.  
In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the Court, in a decision written 
by Justice Brennan, held that a state law granting a sales tax 
exemption to religious publications violated the Establishment 
Clause because it promoted religion over nonsectarian interests.148 In 
doing so, Brennan reasoned that contrary to his own concurring 
opinion in Walz, “[e]very tax exemption constitutes a subsidy.”149 
                                                                                                           
 143. Id. at 668–69.  
 144. Id. at 669.  
 145. See id. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Tax exemptions and general subsidies . . . 
are qualitatively different. Though both provide economic assistance, they do so in 
fundamentally different ways. A subsidy involves the direct transfer of public monies to the 
subsidized enterprise and uses resources exacted from taxpayers as a whole. An exemption, on 
the other hand, involves no such transfer.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 146. Id. at 675 (majority opinion).  
 147. Id. at 676.  
    148. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).  
 149. Id. at 14.  
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Thus, if a state subsidizes a religion through a tax exemption but 
does not do so for secular groups, it has violated the Establishment 
Clause. In a scathing dissent, Justice Scalia rejected this reasoning 
and called upon the Texas Monthly majority to return to the more 
constitutional and historically justified neutrality position from Walz. 
“Walz,” argued Scalia, “is just one of a long line of cases in which 
[the Court has] recognized that ‘the government may (and 
sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do 
so without violating the Establishment Clause.’”150 This position is 
supported by the fact that “the exemption of religion from various 
taxes ha[s] existed without challenge in the law of all 50 States and 
the National Government before, during, and after the framing of 
the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, and ha[s] achieved 
‘undeviating acceptance’ throughout the 200-year history of our 
Nation.”151  
The principle of neutrality, as used in Walz and Scalia’s dissent in 
Texas Monthly, should govern matters of tax law related to religious 
organizations, not the standard adopted by the Texas Monthly 
majority. The reality is that religions and religious organizations, 
particularly churches,152 do hold a unique position in this nation’s 
history and under the Constitution and other laws of this nation.153 
The very existence of “the Free Exercise Clause exemptions and the 
Establishment clause limits seem[s] to presuppose that religion is 
special and distinguishable from other forms of philosophy and 
speech” in American law and society.154 “In fact, it [would be] 
virtually impossible to understand [the American] tradition of 
separation of church and state without recognizing that religion 
                                                                                                           
 150. Id. at 38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals 
Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1987)). 
 151. Id. at 35 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 681 (1970)). 
 152. See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Losing Our Religion: Reevaluating the Section 501(c)(3) 
Exemption of Religious Organizations that Discriminate, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 715, 
728–29 (2009) (arguing that “[a]lthough nearly all religious organizations are eligible for a tax 
exemption under § 501(c)(3), only ‘churches . . . ’ are presumed to be private foundations, 
and thus, excepted from the notice requirements” of the statute).  
 153. See id. at 729 (“The tax exemption of religious organizations—specifically, 
churches—is deep-rooted in American history.”). This fact is also supported by § 501(c)(3). 
Under § 501(c)(3) churches are not required to apply for tax exemption. It is an automatic 
benefit conferred on account of the unique position of churches in our nation’s history. Secular 
organizations do not receive the same treatment. Rather, under § 501(c)(3) non-churches 
must apply for the tax exemption before receiving that benefit. See I.R.C. § 501 (2006). 
 154. Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS J. 303, 304 (2001). 
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raises political and constitutional issues not raised by other 
institutions or ideologies.”155 As the Court noted in Walz, “Few 
concepts are more deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life, 
beginning with pre-Revolutionary colonial times, than for the 
government to exercise at the very least [a] kind of benevolent 
neutrality towards churches and religious exercise generally . . . .”156 
Due to the obvious tension between the two First Amendment 
religion clauses, lawmaking bodies and the courts have an obligation 
to strike an appropriate balance on issues related to religious 
organizations. This same obligation does not exist in matters related 
to nonreligious organizations. As such, this distinction between tax 
exemptions for religious organizations and those for nonreligious 
organizations is critical to this discussion and should guide any 
analysis of tax laws related to religious organizations. This distinction 
also provides an important mechanism by which several of the 
Court’s decisions discussed above can be distinguished in light of 
Citizens United. Much of the jurisprudence governing the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions as it relates to the free speech rights of 
religious organizations should be reevaluated in light of the 
distinctions drawn in Walz and Justice Scalia’s dissent in Texas 
Monthly, and in light of the Court’s decision in Citizens United. If 
religious organizations do, in fact, hold a unique place in our 
nation’s history, as Burger and Scalia argue, the argument can be 
made that such organizations should be allowed to exercise First 
Amendment free speech rights while still qualifying for § 501(c)(3) 
tax exemptions. Part B, below, addresses the legal arguments in favor 
of this position by distinguishing previous case law, and Part C 
addresses a few of the legal- and policy-based arguments that weigh 
against completely eliminating the restrictions of § 501(c)(3).  
B. The Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions and § 501(c)(3) 
The Court’s decision in Regan v. TWR, along with the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, represents one of 
the most significant legal hurdles to any religious organization 
hoping to challenge the political activities test of § 501(c)(3). It 
                                                                                                           
 155. Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1, 3 (2000).  
 156. Walz, 397 U.S. at 676–77, quoted in Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: 
Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 145, 149 (2006). 
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would appear that, by holding that the political speech restrictions 
under § 501(c)(3) do not violate the First Amendment rights of a 
nonprofit corporation, the Court effectively slammed the door on 
any future challenges to that aspect of the Code. This is not the case, 
however. Regan can be distinguished on several grounds in light of 
Citizens United, leaving open the possibility that its holding is not 
applicable to situations governing religious organizations. There are 
two major points on which Regan (and to a lesser degree, Branch) 
may be distinguished: 1) the distinction between religious 
organizations and all other tax-exempt organizations under 
§ 501(c)(3); and 2) the availability, or lack thereof, of less restrictive 
alternatives to § 501(c)(3) in light of the new Citizens United 
framework. If Regan may, in fact, be distinguished from cases 
involving religious organizations, it can be argued that the Speiser-
Perry model of unconstitutional conditions is more applicable to 
questions governing § 501(c)(3) restrictions for religious 
organizations than is the Cammarano framework used in Regan. If 
such is the case, this change in models could have a significant 
impact on any future challenges to the § 501(c)(3) political activities 
test.  
1. Regan does not apply with equal force to religious organizations 
The argument that the Regan holding does not apply with equal 
force to religious organizations is not novel. In fact, that is the very 
argument rejected by the majority in Branch Ministries.157 Again, it is 
important to note that Branch Ministries was a circuit court decision 
and has not been adopted by the Supreme Court, but the decision 
does provide some powerful ammunition against any attempt to 
distinguish Regan.  
The Regan holding, as noted above, did not address tax-exempt 
religious organizations.158 Rather, it focused specifically on the rights 
of a secular, nonprofit corporation. Under the Walz-Scalia 
framework discussed above, this is an important distinction.159 If, as 
Walz and Scalia’s Texas Monthly dissent suggest, over 200 years of 
history support the unique nature of religious organizations in this 
nation’s legal framework, then the “neutrality” approach to the 
                                                                                                           
 157. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 158. See supra Part III.B.1.b. 
 159. See supra Part IV.A. 
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taxation of religious organizations should require a much different 
analysis than what was provided in Regan. Because Regan dealt 
solely with a secular organization, the Court was not forced to 
consider the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause. Nor was it forced to consider the neutrality between 
those clauses, which is provided through tax exemptions for religious 
organizations. Had it done so, the Regan Court may very well have 
taken a different approach in order to account for the impact that the 
revocation of tax exemption could have, not only on free speech 
rights, but also on the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.  
It may be argued that the religious/secular distinction would 
have made little difference in the analysis based on the fact that the 
Branch court considered this distinction and reached largely the 
same conclusion as Regan. This argument lacks logical weight, 
however, because Branch Ministries was decided well after Regan, 
thus requiring the D.C. Circuit to account for the Regan holding 
and synthesize its own rule within that framework. Without the 
reasoning of Regan, it is possible that the Branch Ministries court 
may have reached a very different holding. Given this possibility, and 
the fact that the Branch Ministries decision is not binding on the 
Supreme Court, it is possible that the Supreme Court would develop 
a new line of reasoning on this matter, completely independent of 
the majority holding in Regan. This possibility, along with the new 
framework emphasizing free speech rights in Citizens United, leaves 
the door open for a potentially successful challenge to the 
restrictions of § 501(c)(3). 
2. The availability of less restrictive alternatives to § 501(c)(3) 
The constitutionality of the political activities restriction of 
§ 501(c)(3) was largely dependent on the availability of less 
restrictive means by which a tax-exempt organization could exercise 
free speech rights.160 Without any less restrictive options, “the 
lobbying restriction contained in § 501(c)(3) violates the 
principle . . . that the government may not deny a benefit to a person 
because he exercises a constitutional right.”161 In other words, “in 
isolation,” the political activities restriction of § 501(c)(3) violates 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by requiring an 
                                                                                                           
 160. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 551–54 (1983) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring). 
 161. Id. at 552 (internal quotations omitted).  
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organization to give up its First Amendment free speech rights in 
exchange for a governmental benefit.162 The constitutionality of 
§ 501(c)(3) was saved only by the fact that § 501(c)(3) 
organizations can also create § 501(c)(4) entities, which can legally 
engage in certain forms of lobbying. The Branch Ministries court 
took this reasoning one step further by arguing that PACs created by 
§ 501(c)(4) organizations can engage in practically unlimited 
political activities.163 Any significant restrictions on these options 
would, however, in the words of Blackmun, “negate the[ir] saving 
effect.”164 This issue, therefore, hangs on whether or not, in light of 
the development of Supreme Court jurisprudence (including 
Citizens United), any further restrictions have been placed on these 
political activities.  
The short answer to this question is ‘no.’ The IRS itself has not 
placed any further restrictions on the free speech right of § 501(c)(3) 
religious organizations. However, the mere fact that the Citizens 
United holding seems to expand the general free speech rights of all 
organizations other than those covered by § 501(c)(3) calls into 
question the continuing restrictions on tax-exempt organizations. In 
light of the Citizens United decision, which allows for greater First 
Amendment rights of corporations and other organizations, the 
speech restrictions imposed under § 501(c)(3) are now effectively 
more restrictive simply because they have not expanded to meet the 
increased free speech rights under the Citizens United framework.  
Additionally, it is important to consider the realities of the “less 
restrictive” alternatives to § 501(c)(3), which under both Regan and 
Branch Ministries save the political activities test of § 501(c)(3) from 
being deemed unconstitutional. These options include (1) the 
creation of a PAC and (2) the creation of a § 501(c)(4) organization. 
Regarding the first option, the Citizens United decision has 
made significant changes to the system governing PACs. Although it 
is not entirely clear how exactly these changes will affect such 
committees, it appears that most corporations will no longer be 
required to create PACs in order to participate financially in political 
speech. Accordingly, it seems highly inequitable to require any 
organization, including a tax-exempt religious organization, to 
utilize a PAC in order to exercise its free speech rights when such 
                                                                                                           
 162. Id.  
 163. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 164. Regan, 461 U.S. at 553. 
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committees are no longer required for corporations. With the 
necessity of creating a PAC effectively eliminated for most 
organizations, this option no longer appears to be the “less 
restrictive” means that it seemingly was when the Regan and Branch 
Ministries cases were decided. Under this new reality, creating a PAC 
may no longer provide a viable alternative to the political speech 
restrictions of § 501(c)(3). Therefore, this new change under 
Citizens United could undermine the reasoning of both Regan and 
Branch Ministries and call into question the constitutionality of        
§ 501(c)(3)’s limits on political speech. 
There are also valid grounds on which to challenge the 
determination made by both the Regan and Branch Ministries courts 
that the creation of § 501(c)(4) organizations provides an acceptable 
“less restrictive” alternative to the limits of § 501(c)(3). This is 
especially true in regards to a § 501(c)(3) religious organization. 
Although the option of creating a § 501(c)(4) organization is 
technically available to § 501(c)(3) religious organizations, in reality 
this option is not a practical or reasonable alternative to the limits of 
the political activities test of § 501(c)(3). Religious organizations are 
inherently different from all non-religious organizations, even those 
organizations that are exempt under § 501(c)(3). These inherent 
differences make the creation and use of a § 501(c)(4) organization 
highly impractical for a religious organization. As discussed above,165 
a § 501(c)(4) organization “may engage in an unlimited amount of 
lobbying, provided that the lobbying is related to the organization’s 
exempt purpose.”166 Although § 501(c)(4) allows for unlimited 
lobbying, because such lobbying must be “related to the 
organization’s exempt purpose,” this option is largely if not entirely 
useless to a tax-exempt religious organization. Under § 501(c)(3), a 
religious organization is exempt simply because it is a religious 
organization. This is a broad category, with largely undefined 
boundaries. As such, it would be difficult to determine when 
lobbying relates to a religious organization’s exempt purposes and 
when it does not. This reality makes the use of the § 501(c)(4) 
structure and its benefits impractical as the less restrictive alternative 
the Regan and Branch Ministries courts suggest it is. Because the 
benefits intended by § 501(c)(4) do not apply with any practicality 
to tax-exempt religious organizations, the creation of a § 501(c)(4) 
                                                                                                           
 165. See supra Part III. 
 166. Reilly & Allen, supra note 126. 
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organization is not a less restrictive alternative to the political 
activities test of § 501(c)(3), despite what Regan and Branch 
Ministries claim. Therefore, the free speech restrictions of 
§ 501(c)(3), at least as they apply to tax-exempt religious 
organizations, present an unconstitutional conditions problem in 
light of the Citizens United decision.  
3. Conclusions concerning unconstitutional conditions and 
§ 501(c)(3) organizations 
Because the Court’s decision in Regan can be distinguished on 
the issue of tax exemptions for religious organizations under 
§ 501(c)(3), the Speiser-Perry model of unconstitutional conditions 
should govern any challenge to the free speech restrictions of 
§ 501(c)(3), not the Cammarano-Regan model. This is made 
abundantly clear by key language adopted in the Citizens United 
decision. In addressing the concern that corporations would be able 
to engage in unlimited political speech while continuing to benefit 
financially from the special advantages of the corporate form, the 
Citizens United Court quoted Scalia’s dissent from a previous case, 
which stated, “It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the 
price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment 
rights.”167 In other words, simply because “[s]tate law grants 
corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual 
life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of 
assets,” does not mean the state can prohibit speech.168 By 
comparison, the special advantages afforded by the State to religious 
organizations also may not be conditioned on the forfeiture of First 
Amendment rights. Therefore, in light of the Citizens United 
holding, and the reasoning on which it is based, the political 
activities test of § 501(c)(3) represents an unconstitutional 
conditions problem, which may require the loosening of the free 
speech restrictions currently placed on tax-exempt religious 
organizations.  
                                                                                                           
 167. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (quoting Austin v. Mich. State 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 168. Id. (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 658–59).  
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C. Arguments Against Allowing Continued Tax Exemption 
In light of the Court’s decision in Citizens United, there may be 
support for legal challenges to the political activities restrictions of 
§ 501(c)(3) as they relate to religious organizations. This possibility 
gives rise to the question of how far the political speech rights of tax-
exempt religious organizations should extend if these challenges 
somehow succeed. Where exactly this line should be drawn may be 
an issue for another discussion, but it is helpful to touch briefly on a 
few of the key considerations that could impact that determination. 
This determination will likely depend on how the Court views 
the justifications for tax exemptions and how it ultimately decides to 
deal with the Establishment Clause and the separation between 
church and state. Despite the fact that Citizens United has 
strengthened the free speech rights of all organizations, including 
tax-exempt religious organizations, concern for maintaining the 
separation of church and state under the Establishment Clause may 
ultimately prevent the courts from completely overturning the 
political activities restrictions of § 501(c)(3) in favor of entirely 
unlimited political speech.  
Much of the Court’s discussion in Walz centered on the concern 
for balancing the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment with 
the Establishment Clause and whether or not a tax exemption for a 
religious organization would upset that balance. The Court 
ultimately determined that tax exemptions for religious organizations 
are justified not simply because they tend to promote social welfare 
and good works performed by religious organizations, but because 
they are the best way of maintaining the desired separation between 
church and state. By the Court’s reasoning, “the grant of a tax 
exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer 
part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding 
that the church support the state.”169 In other words, by allowing 
churches to simply keep their money, rather than forcing them to 
contribute to the public coffers, the government minimizes the kind 
of involvement that could upset the balance between church and 
state. The Court conceded that “a direct money subsidy would be a 
relationship pregnant with involvement,” but it found that a tax 
exemption did not rise to the level of a direct subsidy.170 The 
                                                                                                           
 169. Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970). 
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distinction between tax exemptions and direct subsidies is an 
important one that has been addressed in a number of post-Walz 
decisions.171 This distinction, and its obvious implications on the 
issue of the separation of church and state, would play a significant 
role in any challenge to the political activities restrictions of 
§ 501(c)(3) and any determination regarding the length to which 
speech rights of tax-exempt organizations should extend.  
If the political activities restrictions of § 501(c)(3) were 
eliminated entirely, the balance between church and state upheld in 
Walz would be disturbed significantly because it would allow 
religious organizations to engage in political speech and lobbying 
while still receiving significant tax exemptions by virtue of their 
status as religious organizations. The exemptions of § 501(c)(3), 
without the accompanying political activities restrictions, would in 
effect force the government to pay for the political activities of 
religious organizations. Suddenly, such organizations would have 
more money in their pockets to intervene in government affairs, 
thereby upsetting the balance between church and state. This reality 
should raise serious concerns about eliminating the political activities 
restrictions of § 501(c)(3) completely, even in light of Citizens 
United’s reaffirmation of the First Amendment speech rights of 
corporations and other organizations. Perhaps, in the end, the best 
way to balance the various interests at stake—including the interests 
of the State and those tax-exempt religious organizations affected—
would be to simply extend the rights currently found in § 501(c)(4) 
more effectively to religious organizations. In other words, these 
competing interests might be most effectively balanced by allowing 
religious organizations to engage in political speech so long as it is 
related to their religious purpose. As noted above, this standard 
would be difficult to define and even more difficult to enforce, but 
such a system just may be the best solution to what is an obviously 
difficult problem.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Even under the new First Amendment paradigm created by 
Citizens United v. FEC, any challenge to the political activities 
restrictions of § 501(c)(3) as applied to tax-exempt religious 
organizations will face an uphill battle. Many years of established 
                                                                                                           
 171. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).  
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precedent, in addition to a long-standing adherence to the 
separation of church and state, will make it difficult for any such 
challenge to successfully eliminate the political restrictions of 
§ 501(c)(3). Despite this apparent difficulty, the Citizens United 
decision has given the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions 
renewed strength in the argument against conditioning the benefit 
of tax exemption for religious organizations on the willingness of 
those organizations to give up their First Amendment speech rights. 
However, in light of other interests, including adherence to the 
Establishment Clause and the long recognized tradition of separation 
of church and state, some limits on the political activities of tax-
exempt religious organizations should remain intact, preventing such 
organizations from maintaining tax-exempt status if they engage in 
completely unfettered political speech or lobbying. 
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